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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the U.S. weapon system develop-
ment programs of the 1950's, there has been a trend
in our increasingly complicated technological society
to undertake fewer but much larger and more com-
prehensive programs. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's Apollo Program and, more
recently, the Space Shuttle, are examples of this
growth in program magnitude and complexity.
Although the Apollo Program goal was clear, to
reach it required the use of rapidly developing
technology that was based on rapidly increasing
scientific knowledge. It required the organization to
be highly flexible, and it was changed when unex-
pected developments made it necessary. As a
measure of the magnitude of the Apollo Program,
staffing at its peak grew to 390 000 workers in in-
dustry, 33 000 in NASA Centers and 10 000 in
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universities. By 1969, the year of the first lunar lan-
ding, total staffing had been reduced by 190 000. By
1974, it was down to 126 000 (ref. 1).
Enormous as the Apollo effort was and as the
Space Shuttle Program is, such programs may be
viewed as only forerunners of future national pro-
grams that will be even larger and more complex.
Examples of the macrotrends that confront the
future programs arc shown in figures 1 to 5. Al-
though these trends depict aerospace industry pro-
ducts, they are generally applicable to large pro-
grams other high technology industries.
The complexity of the systems have almost gone
beyond the point of human grasp (fig. 1). In fact,
today, the computer is taking control of many of the
traditional management functions relating to the
flow of the millions of parts that must converge into
the final system. And scheduling the work of
thousands of people has become a computer func-
tion in many areas.
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Macrocosts in billions of dollars vs. years from go-
ahead for three NASA programs are shown in figure
2. The curves dramatize the exponential cost in-
creases and extended periods of time required as the
programs become more complex and broader in
scope. The total cost estimate for the Space Shuttle
design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT
& E) program is now 6.18 billion (1971 dollars).
The increasing engineering manpower as a func-
tion of time required for analysis and documentation
and for design is shown in figure 3. Although both
curves are shown exponentially increasing, the
analysis and documentation investment increases at
a greater rate than the design functions. This trend
can be attributed to program objectives involving
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greater risk, investment cost, and scope. The greater
risk in turn drives the decision-making process into
the generation and evaluation of a much greater
number of alternative solutions as the decision tree is
worked.
Figure 4 shows the accelerating trend of engineer-
ing development costs that result from increasing
program complexity. The decreasing production
costs result from increased experience and more
detailed analysis, design, and development.
In the aerospace business the number of test ar-
ticles (fig. 5) available for flight testing has con-
tinually decreased because of the enormous cost and
sophistication of each succeeding generation. For ex-
ample, at present, only four Space Shuttle craft are
budgeted.
These macrotrends are not all-inclusive but
generally give a taste of the harsh flavors that can be
expected. The increasingly complex decision matrix
is unfortunately worked in an exponentially decreas-
ing time frame.
AN APPROACH TO MANAGING LARGE,
COMPLEX PROGRAMS
The work of management can be defined as mak-
ing decisions in terms of the activities of planning,
organizing, staffing, controlling, and directing the
allocation of scarce resources to achieve the organiza-
tional goals, usually with poor management infor-
mation. A proliferation of theories exists as to how
these management activities should be carried out,
and tons of literature exist on concepts such as
authority, responsibility, span of control, and single
reporting (refs. 2 and 3). Most of these principles are
related to so-called vertical management, that is,
management characterized by organization along
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the traditional pattern of the hierarchical chart in
which authority and responsibility flow downward
and information and glory upward.
Critics of vertical management point out that the
work to be performed flows horizontally across the
organization chart and that the hierarchical struc-
ture, by fostering parochialism, creates barriers to
communications and can actually impede the pro-
gress of a program. To overcome these problems,
some mechanism for lateral management is needed.
The most common attempt at a solution is to
superimpose a horizontal program management ac-
tivity over the vertical framework to draw upon and
coordinate selected skills and services present in the
hierarchy (refs. 4 and 5).
In the 1960's people began to seriously apply the
systems approach to the management of large, com-
plex programs. The objective was uncompromisingly
complete coverage of the program management
endeavor. Starting with an analysis of the functions
necessary to carry out a given program, a model was
defined, a matrix of responsibility assignments was
prepared, and each operational process was ex-
amined in detail to establish how it was to be carried
out and how it was related to all other processes.
Planning for implementation of this management
tool was started in 1967 (ref. 6).
As applied to program management, the systems
concept may be viewed as an organized approach to
attaining program objectives by defining and struc-
turing all elements involved in such a way as to form
a single system whose constituent parts arc united by
some form of interaction (fig. 6). The systems
management approach is a method of objectively
considering flows through an organization, with an
information feedback system supplying quantitative
information about the flows, so that decisions can be
made to manage the flows to attain the greatest
payoff relative to organizational goals. And this ac-
tivity takes place in an active environment, not a
vacuum. The word objectively is a key to the
usefulness of the approach. Nowhere is this more
evident than in functional analysis, a process fun-
damental to the concept.
MANAGEMENT PHASES
Because of the immense complexity and large
costs of today's macrosystems, they typically must
last for many years. Also, before the huge in-
vestments that are required are committed, many
studies are made and much debate takes place. All
levels of society may become involved in the sorting
out process, including national and local. The
government is highly involved, except in very
isolated cases. Typical of a macrosystem currently in
the gestation stage is the MX program. The Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) has studied survival basing
modes and missile configurations for many years. A
national debate at all levels of government is now
underway.
Both the DOD and NASA have found it desirable
to formalize the life cycle of typical macrosystems.
The details differ between DOD and NASA, but the
general concepts are identical. Figure 7 shows the life
cycle of a typical macrosystem. During the concep-
tual phase, the mission is defined, requirements are
established, alternative approaches are evaluated,
and advanced development takes place, usually for
the pacing high technologies.
In the definition phase a design baseline is
established, performance specifications are drafted,
and detailed development plans are formulated. The
go-ahead for development is preceded by formal
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high-level government reviews, which are endorsed
by the Administration and Congress. These formal
reviews arc required because large expenditures are
committed when full-scale development is ap-
proved. The development phase consists of design,
test, and production prototypes of the full-scale
macrosystem.
In the operational phase full-scale production and
operational employment are underway. Main-
tenance concepts are implemented; logistics, in-
cluding spares and support, are activated; training
takes place at all levels of the operation; and product
improvements based on operational experience are
evaluated and implemented when desirable. Need-
less to say, once in the operational phase, a macro-
system can consume huge resources. Any mistakes
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not uncovered in previous phases can be very costly
indeed—not only in terms of money and manpower,
but also in terms of operational capability.
The divestment phase is less precise, since many
systems seem to live on forever, at least portions of
them. The DOD can phase a weapon system out of
the Force Structure, but the same system may be
utilized by the National Guard, or by foreign allies,
long afterwards. Therefore, the items associated with
divestment shown in figure 7 often do not take place
completely. Ideally, there would be a phase-down, a
transfer of resources, and a formal critique.
Over the years, formal management phases have
been developed for both DOD and NASA, although
again, the two agencies differ in detail. Figure 8
shows typical program management phases, which
include contract phases, and some formal customer
reviews. Formal baselines are established at certain
points in the management phases, and these are
documented by formal systems specifications to pro-
vide a basis for contractual negotiations, change con-
trol, and formal reviews.
In order to formalize the management process,
system management procedures have been gen-
erated over the years. These are constantly changing
as more experience is accumulated. Some typical
procedures are shown in figure 9, along with
associated objectives. These procedures have
multiplied over the years so that today large
organizations exist just to cope with the formal re-
quirements of major systems. The paperwork
associated with compliance can be astounding!
PLANNING ROADMAP
An overall rationale for planning a complex, high-
technology program is illustrated in figure 10. The
scheme can be generalized so that it is applicable to
any program with deliverable end items. Consid-
erable effort was devoted to structuring the process
by North American Aviation, Inc., (now Rockwell
International Corporation) during the development
of Apollo (refs. 1 and 6). Because of the immense
complexity of the Apollo Program, systematic plan-
ning was essential for success.
It should be emphasized that the procedure
outlined in figure 10 is not another new manage-
ment scheme—there arc indeed too many of these
buried in the literature. Rather, it is an orderly
mechanism for planning a complex program out of
which will fall the traditional products which must
be generated before project initiation such as a Work
Breakdown Structure, Program Plan, Reliability
Plan, Master Program Schedule, Material Review
Procedures, etc.
As discussed previously, there are essentially four
management phases in most large aerospace pro-
grams, viz., conceptual, definition, development,
and operational. The planning roadmap of figure 10
must be generated for each of these phases, especial-
ly for large programs. Good planning is most critical
for the development and operational phases where
most of the resources are expended. Illustrative ex-
amples given in this paper are associated with the
development phase.
As shown in figure 10, the initial planning process
starts with the generation of functional flows. These
define the work to be done, either in series or in
parallel, to fulfill the program requirement. The
work is defined to a level low enough that first-line
supervision can assume meaningful tasks. This plan-
ning process is analogous to the generating of the
Work Breakdown Structure, although by proper for-
malization other planning products will emerge and
the opportunity for good program and functional
management will present itself. Also, generation of
functional flows can be generalized so that a plan-
ning baseline can be established which is applicable
to any program. Generalized functional flows have
been produced (ref. 6). They are extremely useful
tools in attacking the planning of new programs—a
difficult, very creative endeavor.
Once generalized functional flows have been
generated, each activity is assigned to an organiza-
tion element. At this point, generality can be
preserved, as is the case in this paper, or organiza-
tional peculiarities can be introduced to fit a given
program or organization. In any case, the rationale is
applicable whether or not universality is retained.
After responsibility has been assigned to all tasks,
operational process charts can be produced. These
are generated for the functional organization, in-
dependent of program organizational structure. The
need for matrix management now becomes evident
since programs are end-item oriented, and the func-
tional organization used to accomplish interim tasks
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is of little consequence to the program manager.
After the generation of the program tasks and
assignment to organizational elements, task require-
ment sheets can be produced. Because the functional
flows were generated in enough detail for first-line
supervision, these sheets can be given to each
organizational unit for planning purposes. They
constitute the baseline definition of the work to be
performed and schedules to be met, and specify in-
terfaces with other organizational elements.
At this point, the end-item-oricnted program
manager comes into play. He can generate in-
tegrating process charts for each end item or interim
product of interest. The final planning product will
be the definition of each activity, organizational
responsibility, interfaces, and products leading to
FUNCTIONAL FLOW
Figure 12
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the end item. Integrating process charts are in-
valuable tools for project engineers who must track
and forecast cost, schedule, and performance bogies.
FUNCTIONAL FLOW
Functional analysis is predicated on the precept
that, before a decision is made as to how to do
something, a careful look should be taken at what
is to be done. An innocent-appearing proposi-
tion—until examination reveals that we habitually
confuse what with how and that the consequences of
this confusion can be disastrous. The systems ap-
proach seeks to develop a way of thinking, a view-
point, a conceptual framework, together with a
methodology for implementation.
The rationale for generating functional flow is
shown in figure 11. Major functions necessary to
fulfill a program requirement are defined. Seven
major functions are sufficient for the development
phase of most aerospace programs or contracts. Each
major function is then broken down into increas-
ingly finer structure until meaningful tasks are
defined at the level of first-line supervision. Three
levels are generally sufficient to meet this criterion.
In some cases it is necessary to go to the fourth level.
It is convenient to formalize the numbering process
as shown in figure 11. The desirability of this for-
malization will become evident as we progress.
In executing the development phase of a program,
it is assumed that the Advanced Systems people have
captured the program. Therefore, the task before us
is one of execution—whether it is building a little
red wheelbarrow or delivering a Space Shuttle Or-
biter. Therefore, in figure 12 the task of "Capturing
the Program'' is dotted. The remaining six functions
are arranged in series or in parallel, depending on
whether the output from preceding functions is
necessary for execution. The arrangement of figure
12 has been applicable to most major aerospace pro-
grams. The ultimate objective, of course, is to
demonstrate program or contract compliance.
The first-level function, "Determine Re-
quirements," is further broken down in figure 13,
and the second-level function, "Prepare Program
Plans," is cascaded to a third level, as shown in
figure 14. As mentioned above, it is the author's ex-
perience that detail at the third level, and occa-
sionally at the fourth level, is sufficient to define the
work for first-line supervision.
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RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT MATRIX
Each function at the third or fourth level, must
now be assigned to an organizational element for ex-
ecution. In aerospace, 12 endues can accomplish a
complex program, viz.:
Plans & Programs (P)
Configuration Management (C)
System Engineering (S)
Test Operations (T)
Design Engineering (E)
Logistics (L)
Procurement (M)
Facilities (X)
Manufacturing (F)
Data Management (B)
Quality Assurance (Q)
Contract Administration (A)
(To formalize the planning process, it is convenient
RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT MATRIX
Third Level Functions
2.9.1
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to assign letters to each of these organizational en-
tities as indicated.)
For a given organization, these entities may be
grouped or contained within organizational
elements. It is generally advantageous to proceed
with the planning process in a generalized fashion,
independent of organizational peculiarities which,
in most cases, are transient. The tasks which emanate
from the planning process can then be given to ex-
isting functional organizational elements, or alter-
natively, organizational deficiencies will become
evident.
Each third or fourth-level function is now assigned
as a primary task to one of the 12 organizational en-
tities listed above. It should be emphasized that only
one organizational entity has prime responsibility for
each task, although support may be required from
other organizational endues. The procedure for
DEFINITIONS
• ACTIVITY — Transitive Verb
• FUNCTION — Activity + Object
• F' INCTIONAL FLOW — Structured
Functions
• PROCESS — Functional Flow +
Input-Output
Figure 16
responsibility assignment is shown in figure 15. The
letter P denotes prime responsibility and the letter S,
support. For example, the third-level function,
"Review Plans & Revise Schedule" is the prime
responsibility of the organizational entity. Plans &
Programs, with support from System Engineering,
Procurement, Manufacturing, etc.
OPERATIONAL PROCESS CHARTS
At this point it is necessary to formalize certain
definitions peculiar to the planning process as shown
in figure 16. Since all programs are end-item
oriented, each function must be end-item oriented.
Thus, it is not sufficient to define a design function,
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which is functionally oriented, but to define, in ad-
dition, the object to be designed. This difference
between program management and functional
management constitutes the basis for matrix
management. Thus, an activity (project) is a tran-
sient verb requiring an object. A. function is the ac-
tivity plus the object. We will now discuss functional
flows which are structured functions, and processes
which are functional flows plus inputs and outputs.
In order for the first-line supervision to perform a
given task, it is necessary that he or she obtain inputs
from other organizations. These inputs must be
documented. For example, it is not sufficient that a
test be performed; the documented results of the
test must be available for others to accomplish their
tasks. In formalized program or project planning, in-
puts, or formalized documentation can be identified
as requirements for the accomplishment of each
function. The source of these inputs can be iden-
tified, both from an organizational and task view-
point. In figure 17, for example, the first-line super-
visor who has the responsibility for the function,
"Prepare Program Plan," needs inputs from
organizational entities such as, Plans & Programs (?)
and System Engineering (S). His outputs, again,
documented results of his efforts, go to other
organizational elements as inputs to functions.
Finally, an operational process is generated which is
composed of structured functions along with their
associated inputs and outputs. Typical operational
process charts are shown in figure 18. Note the
crossflow of inputs and outputs. Generalized opera-
tional processes for the 12 organizational entities
listed previously have been structured for the Defini-
tion and Development phases of program manage-
ment (ref. 6). These have proven to be invaluable in
planning complex programs.
TASK REQUIREMENT SHEETS
Once the functions have been defined and in-
puts/outputs identified, it is now relatively simple
to produce Task Requirement Sheets. These sheets
can be given to first-line supervision as planning
guides and as tools for managing project respon-
sibilities. Figure 19 is an outline of a Task Require-
ment Sheet. The fourth-level function, 2.5.15a
"Prepare Preliminary Engineering Development
Plan," is assigned to the organizational element,
System Engineering (S), as prime. Support is re-
quired from Contract Administration (A), Data
Management (B), Configuration Management (C),
Logistics (L), Procurement (M), Test Operations (T),
and Facilities (X). The task description is a detailed
outline of the function, "Prepare Engineering
Development Plan." Inputs are the documented
results of the tasks performed by other organiza-
tions; they constitute the outputs from other func-
tions. In turn, the outputs from this function, that
is, the documented results of this task, will con-
stitute inputs to other functions.
INTEGRATING PROCESS CHARTS
Until now, we have dealt with planning a complex
program, defining tasks, and assigning them to
elements of a traditional functional organization.
Over the years, project engineers and program
managers have emerged in the aerospace industry
because of the complexity of programs. Project
engineers have traditionally been hard-nosed people
who chased end-items through the complex maze of
large, cumbersome, bureaucratic organizations.
Often, they have no line authority, but use friend-
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OPERATIONS FACILITY/SPECIAL
TEST EQUIPMENT/SUPPORT EQUIP-
MENT/END ITEM MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (T2.5.14b)
-8 PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF TEST
OPERATIONS SPECIAL TEST EQUIP-
MENT (T2.S.14b)
-9 PRELIMINARY TEST OPERATIONS
TECHNICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE SITE
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (T2.5.14b)
-10PRELIMINARY INTEGRATED TEST
OPERATIONS END ITEM TEST TIME-
LINES (T2.5.14b)
-1 PRELIMINARY TEST OPERATIONS
PLAN (T2.5.14c.S2.5.14b)
PLAN INCLUDES:
MAJOR END ITEM TEST PLAN PER
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
PRESHIPMENT CHECKOUT PLANS
DEVELOPMENT/FLIGHT QUALIFI-
CATION TEST PLAN
FLIGHT-READY, LAUNCH POST-
FLIGHT OPERATIONS PLAN
IDENTIFIES END-TO-END ACTIVI-
TIES FOR:
FACILITY SURVEILLANCE
END ITEM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
INSTALLATION SEQUENCE
END ITEM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
TEST SEQUENCE
END ITEM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
INTEGRATED TEST SEQUENCE
END ITEM FLIGHT VEHICLE TEST
SEQUENCE
END ITEM FLIGHT VEHICLE
INTEGRATED TEST SEQUENCE
Figure 21
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)R PROGRAM TEST PLAN
VIEW ALL PLANS AND PREPARE
ELIMiNARY PLAN REVISION
QUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT
ASE
^ELIMINARY PROGRAM PLANNING
VCKAGE AND REVISION REOUIRE-
ENTSJS2.5.14c.T2.5.14d)
-PRELIMINARY TEST OPERATIONS PLAN
<T2.5.14b-1l
-PRELIMINARY TEST OBJECTIVE SUP-
PORT REQUIREMENT MATRIX (T2.5.14a-2>
•PRELIMINARY TEST TRADE STUDY
REPORT (T2.5.14a-3l
-FINAL TEST OPERATIONS TECHNICAL/
ADMINISTRATIVE SITE SUPPORT RE-
QUIREMENTS (T2.5.l4c-l 1)
-FINAL DEFINITION OF TEST OPERA-
TIONS SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
(T2.5.l4c-10)
-FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERATIONS
FACILITY/SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT/
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT/END ITEM MAIN-
TENANCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS(T2.5.14C-9)
-FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERATIONS
FACILITY/SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
REQUIREMENTS <T2.5.14C-7I
-FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERATIONS
END ITEM TEST TIMELINES (T2.5.14c-12)
-FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERATIONS
FACILITY/SUPPORT EQUIPMENT INSTAL-
LATION AND CHECKOUT TIMELINES
(T2.5.14C-8)
-PRELIMINARY PROGRAM PLANNING
PACKAGE AND REVISION REQUIRE-
MENTS (P2.4.7-1)
-TEST OPERATIONS PLAN OUTLINE
(T2.S.14C-1)
-TEST OBJECTIVE SUPPORT REQUIRE-
MENTS MATRIX (T2.5.14c-2)
-TEST TRADE STUDY REPORT IT2.5.14c-3)
-ALTERNATE TEST APPROACHES(T2.5.14C-4)
PREPARE FINAL TEST OPERATIONS
PLAN
rFINAL TEST OPERATIONS TEST PLAN(T25-1*d-1(
-PRELIMINARY PROGRAM PLANNING
PACKAGE AND REVISION REQUIRE-
MENTS (P2.4.7-1)
-ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT/QUALI-
FICATION TEST PLAN (S2.5.14a-1l
PREPARE FINAL PROGRAM TEST PLAN
S2.5.I4C
-t TEST OPERATIONS PLAN OUTLINE(T2.5.14dl
-2TEST OBJECTIVE SUPPORT REQUIRE-
MENTS MATRIX (T2.5 14d)
-3TEST TRADE STUDY REPORT
(T2.5.14d)
-A ALTERNATE TEST APPROACHES
(T2.5.14d)
-5 FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERA-
TIONS FACILITY/SUPPORT EQUIP-
MENT INSTALLATION AND CHECK-
OUT REQUIREMENTS (T2.S.14d)
-6 FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERA-
TIONS FACILITY/SUPPORT EQUIP-
MENT INSTALLATION AND CHECK-
OUT TIMELINES (T2.5.14d)
-7 FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERATIONS
FACILITY/SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT/
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT/END ITEM
MAINTENANCE SUPPORT REQUIRE-
MENTS (T2.5.14d)
-8 FINAL DEFINITION OF TEST OPER-
ATIONS SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
<T.2.5.14dl
-9 FINAL TEST OPERATIONS TECHNI-
CAL/ADMINISTRATIVE SITE SUPPORT
REQUIREMENT (T2.5.14d)
-10 FINAL INTEGRATED TEST OPERA-
TIONS END ITEM TEST TIMELINES(T2.5.14d)
-1 FINAL TEST OPERATIONS TEST
PLAN (S2.S.14c)
S-SYSTEM ENGINEERING
T-TEST OPERATIONS
P-PLANS AND PROGRAMS
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ship, persuasion, threats, embarrassment, or
whatever tactics arc necessary to push their end-items
through the system. The best project engineer has
usually been the toughest, loudest, and most obnox-
ious of the lot.
With the advent of macrosystems, the ad hoc pro-
ject engineer has been replaced by matrix manage-
ment. This concept is manifested in many forms, in-
cluding powerful project organizations reporting to
the program manager or a single coordinator who
collects the status of end-items based on inputs from
functional managers. The tools for effective manage-
ment of end-items can be easily developed from the
concepts outlined above.
Since the planning process is end-item oriented,
one only needs to identify the end-item of interest
and trace its path through the operational process
charts already generated. In figure 20, for example,
the identified end-item, "Program Plan," is an out-
put from the third-level function, "Prepare Program
Plan," which is performed in the organizational en-
tity, Plans & Programs (P). To prepare the program
plan, inputs, such as Engineering Development
Plan, are required. The Engineering Development
Plan is generated from the function, "Prepare Engi-
neering Development Plan," which is performed in
System Engineering (S). In order to prepare the
Engineering Development Plan, a Preliminary Pro-
gram Plan is required as an input.
Integrating Process Charts can be prepared for
each end-item of interest. The inputs and outputs
needed to generate the end-items can be identified,
organizational interfaces defined, and schedules laid
out for the project engineer. Generalized Integrating
Process Chans can be made for end-items which are
traditionally important to the program manager,
such as the final Program Plan. However, for most
figure 22
Figure 23
programs, it is necessary to make Integrating Process
Charts which are peculiar to a particular program or
project. An example of an Integrating Process Chan
is shown in figure 21. The chan shows some of the
activities of Systems Engineering (S), Test Opera-
tions (T) and Plans and Programs (P) along with in-
puts and outputs leading to the final program test
plan.
In lieu of good project planning, the control room
was born to track the status of end-items of interest
to upper management. Some of these control rooms
have indeed been sights to behold with magnetic
boards, brilliant colors, and even flashing lights. But
when the planning behind these end-items is probed
in depth, it often becomes evident that there is little
or no substance. How many project hours could be
saved with a little forward planning!
MATRIX MANAGEMENT
The planning roadmap of figure 10 has generated
Operational Process Chans for the functional
organization and Integrating Process Charts for the
program management organizations. These plan-
ning tools are illustrated in figure 22. Only certain
end-items are of interest to the program manager
(such as those shown in fig. 23). In addition to pro-
ject management responsibilities, the functional
organizations must retain expertise in several
disciplines, generate long-range plans to maintain
the enterprise, operate facilities, prepare for future
projects, etc. Thus, the functional organization must
be responsible for long-range corporate health, while
the program managers are concerned with their end-
items to satisfy the immediate customers (fig. 23).
Upper management must be sensitive to the motives
of both functional and program management and
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balance priorities accordingly. Even organizations
such as NASA are concerned with these conflicting
motivations. In NASA, for example, the Space Shut-
tle is an important program that requires the support
of all the NASA centers. On the other hand, the
long-range health of the Agency must be preserved
for the post-Shuttle era.
A mixed program and functional or matrix
organization (fig. 24) is generally the preferred struc-
ture for the aerospace industry with its large, com-
plex programs and rigid cost, schedule, and perfor-
mance standards. Both the program and functional
groups benefit. The program is emphasized by
designating one individual as a focal point for ail
matters pertaining to it. Manpower utilization is
flexible and cost-effective because a reservoir of
specialists is maintained in functional organizations
and is employed by the program only when needed.
Specialized knowledge is available to all programs,
and the transfer of knowledge and experience among
programs takes place through the functional
organization. Project people have a functional
home. Responsiveness to program needs and
customer desires is generally faster than for purely
functional or for purely project organizations.
Management consistency among programs and pro-
jects can be maintained. A balance among cost,
schedule, and performance can be obtained for up-
per management through built-in checks and
balances.
The establishment of a matrix organization is no
panacea (refs. 7 and 8), and conflicts will constantly
:arisc between program or project and functional
groups. The tendency of upper management is to
support the program since the program needs affect
this years profit, or this years budget, or this years
customer. "Head Mothers" or functional managers
need to be supported for the corporate good. The
first step is insisting on good program baselines so
that both functional and program management can
accomplish adequate planning. An easy but painful
alternative is to react to immediate problems, leav-
ing both corporate and customer needs unsatisfied.
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